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Afghanistan and COIN warfare - can Western World make an impact?

All,

Let me state upfront this is NOT intended to be a political thread. If it becomes one, I hope the MODS quickly shut it down.

But I've been thinking this one over for some time. There are a LOT of mil/vet types on B&B. All of us have opinions and thoughts on this topic. I'm not saying we can solve the current situations in the Middle East, but that we can surely have a lively, yet professional discussion that may, in the end, effect our thinking on our global situation as human beings. As we are a site that promotes all things gentlemanly, we should be able to speak as gentlemen.

Thus...the long preface before I pose the question and my thoughts...if you can't be gentlemanly about this topic, then please, I ask you...pass on to another thread.

But...if you're interested in having a discussion/debate about the merits of COIN warfare and its feasibility in modern times...please continue.

That said...here is my simple question upfront. Can the Western World, with all its amazing benefits and horrible frustrations..."win" a Counterinsurgency (COIN) conflict?

My thoughts...
COIN (as it is referred to now in every corner of the Western military) requires a scalpel approach. Win the hearts and minds of the populace, rebuild infrastructure and make lives better while using precision to cut out the few bad seeds in the existing society and convincing the surrounding populace that they were in fact bad seeds.

But the military, in its current manifestation, is more of a broadsword than a scalpel. Our ability to conduct "true" COIN...live amongst the populace, act with them in unison...identify the bad seeds etc. will always be hampered by factors such as:

1) The large bases we've created today in SWA.
2) The inability to get "outside the wire" and in the face of the populace we are there to protect.
3) The constant focus at home on body count vs the more nebulous, less measurable, positive effect on the local populace.

These factors, are but a few that I believe hamper our ability to truly "do" COIN warfare.

So...active duty and vets alike...what do ye think?
 
It's a very hard road. The Continental Army fought an insurgent type war with the brits, and looked what it got us. Insurgency/guerilla warfare is highly effective against a large standing force. When you can adapt and change your ways overnight on how you prosecute your war, you will always have an advantage over a larger more slowly moving force.

All the places I have been deployed to are about 90% occupied with people who will never go outside the wore, or drop a bomb, they are simply support personnel. These people are constantly clogging up the war by adding regs, or simply taking up room and affecting a negative impact on the actual warfighter. While these people are necessary, I don't think the amount we have is. We have almost 10 support troops for every shooter/dropper. That's insane.
 
I have many things to add/say/explain in respect to this topic. However out of respect to this board I won't.
Good luck with it.
 
These people are constantly clogging up the war by adding regs, or simply taking up room and affecting a negative impact on the actual warfighter. While these people are necessary, I don't think the amount we have is. We have almost 10 support troops for every shooter/dropper. That's insane.

Excellent point and exactly the type of discussion I was trying to generate! Can the Western military, in its current manifestation...make a positive impact? While the Marines in Marjeh are currently setting the example...I would argue they are the exception...not the rule. COIN warfare is fought in the streets with the people. Yet...we seem to fight it by going out...interfacing with the people...then returning to the relative safety of our FOBs or lairs.

On a larger scale...this brings up an even bigger question...are we properly configured for such conflict? Secretary of Defense Gates said in the Fall of 2008 that the US DoD needs to restructure completely on a massive scale similar to the National Security Act of 1947...a drastic change in how we do business and how we look as a military force.

Is this feasible in our politically charged climate?

I have many things to add/say/explain in respect to this topic. However out of respect to this board I won't.
Good luck with it.

Fair enough...you're doing what I asked folks to do...thanks!
 
This is an excellent post; and hopefully, discussion. My opinion, using the the military in its current manifestation against the enemy and their tactics; no, I do not think we can win a COIN. This doesn't mean I think we cannot win the war; but, I do not think we can use the "hearts and minds" strategy. This is a long term strategy, and unless something changes, the American population has grown tired of this war and I do not believe they have the heart to continue. I hope I'm wrong.
 
I just...dont even know where to start.

This is something that's been floating around in my head every time I've come over to this wonderful place.

The short part of my thoughts on the matter: Great idea.

BUT, since success hinges on support from the Afghan side of the plate (which is about as strong as al dente noodle) I'm not so sure about the actual big picture impact.

Having been a direct recipient of information and good will that would not have been given if we hadn't played "Nice guys," I can say that COIN works, to an extent.

It comes at the expense of softening escalation of force procedures and rules of engagement.

This costs lives.

Is it worth it?

Well…all the way back to Alexander the Great, nations have come here. (Why? I dunno. This place sucks. Really. I think it was that whole ancient trade route thing…) They have provided jobs, reinforced or emplaced governments, provided trade and income and indirectly attempted to boost standards of living. Even before that, invasions brought the most defining social feature of this area: Islamic religion.

Hell, the Russians were the only people I can think of who were actually invited into the country, not too long ago.

What’s happened with all of this? Hard headedness and corruption have conquered all who’ve come here.

What will happen with COIN? Corruption will destroy it as well.

Anecdote after anecdote, as well as hard evidence (anyone remember that horrible US airstrike in 2008 that wiped out a whole innocent village…and then was quietly retracted a week later when it was found out that it never really happened? Thanks, Karzai.) will point towards the ultimate likely failure of not only COIN but the operation currently taking place due to the lack of actual, tangible support from the local government.

As for the long part of my opinion/experience/ideas…it requires beer and actual talking.

:)

Flame on.
 
We have almost 10 support troops for every shooter/dropper. That's insane.

I'll agree there. Having played both sides of the fence (both sides of the COIN, if you will?) I can say that both sides have their share of frustrations. Talking about them is way outside the scope of this thread, however.

Did you know, though, that that's in the middle of changing? There's movemets going on right this very second that are replacing "Paper pushers with trigger pullers." That's a quote from Stars and Stripes that stuck with me, so I thought it'd be fun to use it.

ok, ok...I'll un hijack this thread.

:)
 
Alexander the Great was really the only commander to have any true success in Afghanistan and he had to buy off most of the warlords and marry the daughter of the most powerful one before he was considered victorious.

Kaplan's book Imperial Grunts: The American Military On The Ground is a good book on this subject, talking about past American successes in COIN type warfare, namely the Phillipines and even the American Indian Wars.
 
All in all I don't think we will win hearts and minds in Afganastan for several reasons.


I don't think the afgan people or anyone else in the world including the US Government truly believes that we (US and other coalition forces) are there for the long haul. For one thing WE (to further mean US and other coalition forces or countries) have little or no connection with Afganastan. Its only export is opium, and a very tiny number of us have a friends or relations (excluding military personnel) there. WE are also 500 years seperated from the afgan population. Unfortunately Afganastan has no real place in the modern world. In the ancient world as previously stated Afganastan was a huge trading center, and filled a valuable role in the "world" as a whole, today it is essentialy devoid of any economic power and place.

Think of how you would feel if an advanced alien life suddenly appeared in the sky to "help" the United States rid itself of left handed people. Would you trust or help them? Would you turn in your neighbor, family menber, or co worker? I am sure that is much the way that the afgan people see the US.

Ultimately when you have nothing in common (people, trade, history, enemy etc) winning the hearts and minds of a foreign nation take commitment and time. Two things that WE do not have for Afganastan, and the afgan people and the enemy both know that.

I also believe that it also takes more than a military force. It takes Engineers, Managers, Dr's, Nurses, Teachers, in order to truly build a nation which is what we are ultimately trying to do. Which is another thing WE are not willing to commit. Unfortunately it also takes natural resources of some variety which are also in short supply in Afganastan.

Just my opinion, I could be wrong.
 
My reply to this is why do you expect to succeed when the Soviet Union tried exactly the same tactics that NATO is trying now...Why do you think we can succeed where the massive commitment of political, military and economic power of that country failed?

Ultimately, the situation regarding the intervention in Afghanistan now is eerily similar to the Soviet Union adventure there from 1979-89. Because the current Afghan government is seen as having been installed by NATO this has translated into a great many Afghans seeing the government as a tool of infidel foreign invaders. This is an exact mirror to how Afghans viewed the PDPA government which came to be seen as installed by the Soviets, even though the accurate picture is much less clear as the PDPA came to power in April 1978.

The Karzai government is intensely corrupt in exactly the same way that the PDPA government was during the Soviet intervention. When the Soviets went into the country on December 24th 1979, it was supposed to be for a limited period - a few months - to secure supply lines and help the PDPA regime to defend itself against the Mujaheddin by building up the Afghan Army to take care of itself. Sound familiar? In the event the Soviets could not stop the endemic corruption (e.g units used to sell their weapons to the rebels) of the Afghan Army as well as massive rates of desertion.

What this translated to was that the Soviet Army ended up having to conduct all offensive operations themselves against the Mujaheddin, which in turn meant that increasingly the Soviet Army became the target for the resistance and seen as foreign occupying power. Coupled with the fact that the Soviet Army then followed a quite brutal counterinsurgency warfare program, which involved forcibly "depopulating" the countryside, wiping out villages by design or by accident and destroying food supplies this was a recipe for disaster.

The issue with using development - previously mentioned - as a strategy is an even greater problem because the US and its allies are attempting to apply aid in the western model to Afghanistan. This means the attempted imposition of western democratic values, western notions of women's rights and secularization into a primitive and tribal culture. A previous case study of this would be the abject failure of the USSR in this regard. The Soviets spent over $3 billion in economic aid - the military operation cost them $96 billion - in Afghanistan from 1980 to build schools, impose a Marxism-Leninism, secularization and educate women. Again, does any of this this sound familiar? As well the USSR sent thousands of Soviet civilian personnel to conduct development work, e.g engineers for the gas fields, doctors etc etc. In the end this was all a wasted effort because the Mujaheddin resistance and Islamic tribal leaders did not want women to be educated or to have a secular society.

Milton Bearden - CIA Field Officer in Afghanistan 1986 to 1989 - has called Afghanistan the 'Graveyard of Empires' and there is a good reason for this. There is no way we can succeed there.
 
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I know it's not this simple, but for purposes of this thought experiment, imagine a spectrum.

In the middle are moderates, average civilians of both Afghanistan and the Western world. Those of us in the middle want a place in the world economic order; we want our children to have a chance at a life better than ours; we want prosperity, peace, and freedom. This is most of the world, most of all ethnicities, religions, classes.

On one extreme of the spectrum are the true believer jihadis. They will stop at nothing to establish a worldwide Caliphate, they believe their cause supremely righteous, and they will kill and die for it. You will never change their mind.

On the other end of the spectrum are those who believe that one American life is worth more than a sea of dead Afghanis, who believe that our foreign policy should be to impose our will and advance our "national interest" without consideration for anyone else. They too believe their cause is righteous, and you will never change their mind.

I would like to suggest that the fight is not between the extremes of the spectrum. They need each other. They feed off each other. Their existence is justified by the existence of the other. The real fight is between the moderates and the extremists. The extremists try to pull as many people from the middle toward their side as they can; they try to change the distribution from a bell curve filled with moderates to a distribution with two humps, one on either end. For the jihadis, the "far enemy" may be in the Pentagon, but the "near enemy" is the moderates in their own country who are competing with them for power. All politics is local.

I know this is oversimplifying an extremely complex situation, but I believe this underlying dynamic is the single most important deciding factor in success or failure. If killing a jihadi pushes two more moderates into their camp, taking that shot is a losing proposition. We can kill insurgents. But cutting off their recruitment is just as important. And we really, really messed that up.

I think at this point our only real option seems to slowly and carefully pull out, trying our damndest to leave Afghanistan and Iraq with a relatively capable, moderate, self-appointed government in place. Then it will be those poor bastards who get to fight their own extremists for the next twenty years.

Edit to add a disclaimer: I've never served, I've never been over there, and I don't really know what I'm talking about. Still, I follow the news more than most, read more history than most, and care about the wellbeing of Americans and allies in uniform over there, some of them my friends. As such I have tried my best, from way over here, to get a grasp on what's going on, way over there. As such I have opinions--but they're "soft" opinions, I'm aware that they're not grounded in real experience or expertise. If you tell me I don't know what I'm talking about, or that I'm thinking about it all wrong, I won't take it personally, but rather listen and try to learn from what you have to say.
 
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Perhaps a wall around the country would be a better idea than a COIN op. Not to keep people out, (who the HELL wants in??) but...

:)
 
This is a long term strategy, and unless something changes, the American population has grown tired of this war and I do not believe they have the heart to continue. I hope I'm wrong.

You bring up an excellent point I hoped someone would make about the nature of modern warfare. The inclusion of the media, in its present form, has drastically altered warfare. In WWII, while Ernie Pyle may have been with the troops, his reports often took days or weeks to reach the homefront. Bodycounts from a particular battle (Huertgen Forest comes to mind) did not reach the American populace for months or years. Nowadays, everytime Marine, Soldier, Sailor or Airmen X dies in combat...its headline news within hours.

This has changed, not the face of war...to quote John Keegan, but definitely how it is fought. Nations engaging in modern conflict need to be cognizant of the fact that deaths will reach the populace sooner...and have the potential to turn the tide of national sentiment against the conflict.

Ultimately when you have nothing in common (people, trade, history, enemy etc) winning the hearts and minds of a foreign nation take commitment and time. Two things that WE do not have for Afganastan, and the afgan people and the enemy both know that.

I also believe that it also takes more than a military force. It takes Engineers, Managers, Dr's, Nurses, Teachers, in order to truly build a nation which is what we are ultimately trying to do. Which is another thing WE are not willing to commit. Unfortunately it also takes natural resources of some variety which are also in short supply in Afganastan.

Doc,

You hit the nail on the head here IMHO. Time...is not on our side. COIN warfare takes time. You dont surgically remove bad elements of a foreign society in a year or ten years. It takes a generation! Children growing up now would have to see Coalition Forces as having a positive impact on society...that way, when they grow up...they can choose between a "positive gamechanger" or the insurgents in their midst.

Further, every time we act erroneously and hurt civilians...we have the potential of creating more bad guys...or in the very least, creating an apathetic populace.

As an Infantry buddy of mine said..."Every soldier joined the Army to win its nations wars and 'fight the bad guy'....but this conflict is not that simple."

Great point!

The issue with using development - previously mentioned - as a strategy is an even greater problem because the US and its allies are attempting to apply aid in the western model to Afghanistan. This means the attempted imposition of western democratic values, western notions of women's rights and secularization into a primitive and tribal culture. A previous case study of this would be the abject failure of the USSR in this regard. The Soviets spent over $3 billion in economic aid - the military operation cost them $96 billion - in Afghanistan from 1980 to build schools, impose a Marxism-Leninism, secularization and educate women. Again, does any of this this sound familiar? As well the USSR sent thousands of Soviet civilian personnel to conduct development work, e.g engineers for the gas fields, doctors etc etc. In the end this was all a wasted effort because the Mujaheddin resistance and Islamic tribal leaders did not want women to be educated or to have a secular society.

I think this is a key point as well...A SOF buddy of mine once said: "Democracy isn't for everyone." The key in a COIN conflict, if you want to "win"...although I think its not unrealistic to think that winning COIN is the wrong wording...is to learn the foreign culture and shape your strategy around that culture.

If we do not do so...it appears more as if the Coalition is trying to turn Afghanistan into a Western Society vs. take out the Taliban and Al Qaeda influence in the country.

I think at this point our only real option seems to slowly and carefully pull out, trying our damndest to leave Afghanistan and Iraq with a relatively capable, moderate, self-appointed government in place. Then it will be those poor bastards who get to fight their own extremists for the next twenty years.

When I read your post...the thing that stuck the most in my mind was this paragraph...

The current thinking by many in the USG and elsewhere is that if we slowly pull out without a stable government and host nation security network...we'll be back in 10 or 15 years after another 9/11 or when some other globally impacting event takes place and these two countries are the incubator.

No one can predict the future...but...if you leave cold turkey....it is safe to assume chaos would reign.

Further...and more perplexing for the purposes of the discussion is this:

Now that we've spent this much blood, money, time and effort over there...if we pull out and the countries cave in on themselves...have we failed? Why did our men/women give their lives?

This is a very sensitive subject I know...but with the above thinking in mind...these type of COIN conflicts have the potential of turning into self licking ice cream cones. We need to make those countries right to justify the sacrifices of all who have come before us etc.

At some point...a decision needs to be made that enough blood has been shed and that we did what we came to do...but when? What are the HARD objectives?
 
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Very interesting and important discussion gentlemen. I've learned a lot.

I want to mull over the points that you've all made, so I only have two brief comments.

The first is that in both Afghanistan and Iraq, we are engaging in operations that are not on our own territory. Not only isn't it within the borders of our home country; it is not even within one of our colonies. Because we are acting in the space of what is--of course in very different ways--a sovereign nation, there are significant limitations on our ability to act. We could make this a moral argument, but I'm speaking in purely "realpolitik" terms. The nature of our presence suggests to me that we are unable to effectively carry out the broad spectrum of operations necessary for our success. We do not have the latitude to do what the French did in Algeria (and lost) or the British in Malaya (and won--at least in the short-term) or the United States in our frontier wars. At the same time, we cannot wait it out like the British in Ireland. Is it practical to wage an operation like this if we are so constrained from the start? Is it reasonable to believe that, even with unlimited resources, COIN is winnable?

The second point that I'd like to raise is the idea of Imperial overreach. This is the strategic version of a bridge too far--Paul Kennedy explores the idea in very compelling terms in his classic "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers." Can we afford to take the time that strategists believe necessary to win a COIN operation in Afghanistan? What will our future engagement be in Iraq? Several years ago, the economist Joseph Stiglitz called Iraq the Three Trillion Dollar War. Who knows what the final reckoning will be? Is it in our national interest even to win if we continue to hemorrhage capital in doing so?
 
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Very interesting and important discussion gentlemen. I've learned a lot.

I want to mull over the points that you've all made, so I only have two brief comments.

The first is that in both Afghanistan and Iraq, we are engaging in operations that are not on our own territory. Not only isn't it within the borders of our home country; it is not even within one of our colonies. Because we are acting in the space of what is--of course in very different ways--a sovereign nation, there are significant limitations on our ability to act. We could make this a moral argument, but I'm speaking in purely "realpolitik" terms. The nature of our presence suggests to me that we are unable to effectively carry out the broad spectrum of operations necessary for our success. We do not have the latitude to do what the French did in Algeria (and lost) or the British in Malaya (and won--at least in the short-term) or the United States in our frontier wars. At the same time, we cannot wait it out like the British in Ireland. Is it practical to wage an operation like this if we are so constrained from the start? Is it reasonable to believe that, even with unlimited resources, is COIN winnable?

The second point that I'd like to raise is the idea of Imperial overreach. This is the strategic version of a bridge too far--Paul Kennedy explores the idea in very compelling terms in his classic "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers." Can we afford to take the time that strategists believe necessary to win a COIN operation in Afghanistan? What will our future engagement be in Iraq? Several years ago, the economist Joseph Stiglitz called Iraq the Three Trillion Dollar War. Who knows what the final reckoning will be? Is it in our national interest even to win if we continue to hemorrhage capital in doing so?

Awesome points Niddy...thanks much!

You contemplate points such as the above and you begin to wonder whether or not COIN is successful at all unless the Nation State waging COIN warfare on another territory decides to devote its whole attention to it (unrealistic) and for as long and as much as it takes (doubly unrealistic).

As you pointed out...you are away from your home turf and on someone elses...and they have all the time in the world.

After my stint downrange awhile back, I thought of the irony of how we were conducting this COIN op at the time. Military units would ride up to Village X in their heavily armored HMMWVs, MRAPs etc. get out wearing loads of body armor and packing all kinds of heat and radios and enter a mud hut (or in the case of Iraq...relatively poor buildings) and subsequently tell the inhabitants they were safe and all was ok. Then...after hours of sitting there etc, the unit would eventually head back to the heavily defended FOB...and the villager was left in their own environment with insurgents in their midst.

Does that send the message of safety?

Again...this new op in Marjeh seems to be doing it better...but is it a day late and a dollar short?
 
Can the Western World, with all its amazing benefits and horrible frustrations..."win" a Counterinsurgency (COIN) conflict?

The conflict in Afghanistan is a classic example of COIN warfare, as the military is constantly battling an invisible force of insurgents who, using guerilla tactics, never stay long enough to be identified and or targeted. From an historical perspective, even in just this one conflict we can see that the likelyhood of success is minimal. The counterinsurgency struggle has been the gotterdamerung of the wests military forces for well over 150 years. A determined and small force of soldiers using hit-run tactics is a highly formiddable opposition. COIN warfare has been active since the 1700s/1800s and has become more developed in the past 60 or so year. Lesson learnt in spain during the 1936 civil war, and the 1940s campaign by Titos partisans shows us that the likely of gaining significant ground whilst remaining inside the letter of the law, is minimal. The SS anti-partisan units had to take extraordinary measure to gain even minimal ground on an enemy that could be anyone, a paralell we can see today in the conflict in Afghanistan, a similar paralell can be drawn by the borders of Pakistan and other nations close by that the enemy can retreat across, knowing the pursuing forces dare not cross it for risk of causing an international incident. The solution to this was used to good advantage in the 1950s by the Special Air Service in Borneo, where Operation "Claret" led teams across international borders illegally in pursuit of CT's. This convention was followed in Malaya and Vietnam, and is possibly being used now. When one side respects the law and the otherside breaks it at every opportunity, there is no way the side acting legitimately can win. Especially when, as in Vietnam and numerous other late 20th century conflicts, the local populace COULD be aiding and abetting or even be the force you are fighting, but you cannot prove it, see the Mai lai massacre for further discussion. The only logical and financially viable option to this is a "scorched earth" policy, which we know no government short of the USSR would use for fear of condemnation and retribution.

We can also see from Afghanistans 150 history of conflict with the West, that the chances of success are small, as the Soviet unions might and tactics could not defeat them, nor the might of the British Empire without serious casualties, cause any great dent in their forces. The comparison between Afghanistan and Vietnam (the architypal unwinnable war) is that you have a small but dedicated nomadic populace (both formed from 'tribal' civil war, between the NVA & SVA for example and the Mujhahuddin, the Talib', and the many small other tribes that formed Afghanistans early populace), we can also compare the caves and tunnels of the tora Bora etc. with the tunnels and jungle of Vietnam, and the harsh unforgiving landscapes both have.

Therefore I believe that unless we take extreme action such as the wholesale massacre of the indigenous population, through either bombing or poisoning of the water supplies (The Germans had similar problems in the Crimea in 1942 and to restrict deaths of their man resorted to using poison gas to flush the enemy from their tunnels and stockades), we have a perpetual war on our hands until we either hand back governance to the Afghan government at which point the Talib and Al Quaeda will hold power again through forced/rigged elections and terror, or until we surrender.

I could go on but fear more than one of you is dead from boredom already.

Tom
 
Therefore I believe that unless we take extreme action such as the wholesale massacre of the indigenous population, through either bombing or poisoning of the water supplies (The Germans had similar problems in the Crimea in 1942 and to restrict deaths of their man resorted to using poison gas to flush the enemy from their tunnels and stockades), we have a perpetual war on our hands until we either hand back governance to the Afghan government at which point the Talib and Al Quaeda will hold power again through forced/rigged elections and terror, or until we surrender.

Not bored at all; in fact, I believe you stated the only other option. Of coarse we would never do that, as much as the U.S. poplulation doesn't have the "heart" to go the COIN route all the way; like hell if they would go for a mass slaughter (can't you just imagine the front page of the N.Y. Times).

I have to wonder what the brass and suits are thinking. I mean, if a couple of yokels on a shaving forum can hash this out why can't they. What do they know that we don't, and what is the ultimate plan?
 
I have to wonder what the brass and suits are thinking. I mean, if a couple of yokels on a shaving forum can hash this out why can't they. What do they know that we don't, and what is the ultimate plan?

LMAO at that one...

I can see it now:

Katie Couric: "So Barracuda...how did you solve the war on Afghanistan?"

Barracuda: "Well, a few guys had this discussion on a shaving website called Badger and Blade and...."

Such a story would never make it in the press...the Afghans would think we were out to change their culture and customs...a shaving website figuring out the war in Afghanistan??? I mean...have you seen their beards? :lol:
 
After reading all of this thread, I have to say that parts of what Unknownsoldier wrote resonate with me. Everytime I see news regarding Afghanistan, I think back to Viet Nam.

In any situation like Afghanistan, the population has to want what we offer enough to fight for it and their politicians have to have a true desire to serve their people and not a personal agenda. I don't see that in the Afghan government.

Don't laugh too hard Ru4scuba. There's more integrity and ethical behavior on the B&B than in Washington.
 
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